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A rule that generally precludes defendants from taking advan-
tage of post-conviction changes in the law, but allows the State
to do so, cannot be reconciled with this Court's duty to admin-
ister justice impartially.
14
Justice Stevens also pointed to an apparent change in the Court's
application of the Strickland standards for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim: "Strickland makes clear that the merits of an ineffective
assistance claim mustbe'viewed as of the time ofcounsel's conduct."'
15
Stevens argued that this standard should apply to the prejudice prong, as
well as to the quality of counsel's performance: "By defining prejudice
in terms of the effect of counsel's errors on the outcome of the proceed-
ings, based on the 'totality of the evidence before the judge or jury,' the
Strickland Court establishes its point of reference firmly at the time of
trial or sentencing."t
6
In contrast, the majority opinion maintained that the requirement
that counsel's conduct be assessed based at the time of trial did not apply
14 Lockhart, 113 S.Ct. at 852-853 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 849 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
16 Lockhart, 113 S.Ct. at 849 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695
(citation omitted)). Justice Stevens also found that Fretwell's attorney
had so fundamentally failed the first prong of the Strickland test that
Fretwell might be entitled to relief even if he could not show prejudice
under the second prong:
The fact that counsel's performance constituted an abject
failure to address the most important legal question at issue in
to the prejudice prong because "[prejudice] focuses on the question
whether counsel's deficient performance renders the results of the trial
unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair."' 17 If an open
question previously existed as to the timing of the prejudice analysis
under Strickland, the majority opinion makes it clear that it is the law
existing at the time of review that is to be considered in determining
prejudice.
Now that prejudice under a Strickland claim is analyzed in light of
changes in the law beneficial only to the State, the need for timely
objection at trial is all the more important. After Fretwell, even failure
to raise a claim that clearly constituted attorney incompetence may not
result in relief if the law changes unfavorably. When added to the major
hurdle of the Teague retroactivity rule, the Court has built an effective
roadblock to capital defendants seeking habeas relief.
Summary and Analysis By:
Susan F. Henderson
his client's death penalty hearing gives rise, without more, to
apowerful presumption of breakdown in the entire adversarial
system.... In other words, there may be exceptional cases in
which counsel's performance falls so grievously far below
acceptable standards under Strickland's first prong that it
functions as the equivalent of an actual conflict of interest,
generating a presumption of prejudice and automatic reversal.
Id. at 851.
17 Id. at 844.
GRAHAM v. COLLINS
113 S.Ct. 892 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On May 13, 1981, Gary Graham shot Bobby Grant Lambert to
death in the parking lot of a Houston grocery store during the course
of a robbery. At trial Graham's mistaken identity defense failed and
he was convicted of capital murder. At the sentencing phase, after the
state presented evidence that Lambert's murder began a week during
which Graham committed a series of violent crimes, Graham at-
tempted to put on evidence in mitigation of his general good character
I The Texas capital-sentencing statute at the time of Graham's
trial required the jury to consider:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
of the deceased was committed deliberately and with reason-
able expectation that the death of the deceased would occur;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence
whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased
was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
traits, his relative youth, and a positive employment history. Applying
the "special questions" scheme of the Texas capital-sentencing stat-
ute, 1 the jury sentenced Graham to death. After the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence and the state courts rejected
Graham's attempts at post-conviction relief, Graham petitioned in
federal district court for habeas corpus relief arguing that ajury could
not give proper consideration to his mitigating evidence within the
confines of the Texas special issues scheme. The district court and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Graham's petition for
Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071 (b) (Vernon 1981). In order for
the death sentence to be imposed the jury was required to unanimously
answer all three questions in the affirmative.
The Texas legislature amended the death penalty statute in 1991
in response to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The current law
instructs the jury that "it shall consider all evidence ... including
evidence of the defendant's background or character or the circum-
stances of the offense which militates for or mitigates against the
imposition of the death penalty." Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art.
37.071(d)(1) (Vernon 1993).
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relief.2 While Graham's petition to the United States Supreme Court
was pending, the Court decided Penry v. Lynaugh,3 which held that
Texas' special issues scheme prevented a jury from giving effect to
evidence of child abuse and mental retardation under the facts of that
case.
In light of Penry, the Supreme Court remanded Graham's case for
further consideration, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals
reversed and vacated the death sentence.4 On rehearing en banc,
however, the Fifth Circuit reinstated the sentence, andrejected Graham's
claim on the merits, holding that the second special issue concerning
future dangerousness adequately encompassed Graham's mitigating
evidence of relative youth and good character.5 The court further noted
that the Texas capital-sentencing scheme had been upheld in 1976 in
Jurek v. Texas,6 and in order to rule in Graham's favor in this case, the
court would have been required to fashion and retroactively apply a new
rule in violation of Teague v. Lane.7
HOLDING
Because this case came before the United States Supreme Court on
collateral review, the Court noted that it was required to determine
whether the requested relief required the creation of a new constitutional
rule.8 The Court held that Graham's claim was barred by Teague,
because reasonable jurists in 1984 could have believed that the Texas
special issues scheme was constitutional.9 According to the majority,
ruling in Graham's favor would have required the Court to create a "new
rule" and retroactively invalidateJurek v. Texas. The Court also held that
Graham's case fell outside Teague's two exceptions because (1) it
"would neither decriminalize a class of conduct nor prohibit the imposi-
tion of capital punishment on a particular class of persons," 10 and (2) this
case did not involve the announcement of a watershed rule of criminal
procedure.11
Furthermore, to the extent Graham relied on Penry v. Lynaugh in his
appeal, the majority ruled that Penry was inapplicable to Graham's case.
Penry's challenge succeeded because on the facts of that case the jury
was incapable of giving effect to Penry's mitigating evidence within the
structure of the Texas special issues scheme. By contrast, the majority
found that Graham was fully capable of putting his mitigating evidence
before the jury and the jury was able to give it proper effect.
12
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In Teague v. Lane, the United States Supreme Court held that a
habeas petitioner may not employ a new rule from a case decided after
his sentence became final unless the case falls under one of two
exceptions.13 Like most cases involving a Teague threshold determina-
tion, an analysis of this case requires examination of the law which was
available at the time the petitioner's sentence became final.
Graham based his petition for habeas corpus relief on Penry v.
Lynaugh. Penry represented the first major break from Jurek v. Texas,
2 Graham v. Lynaugh, 854 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth
Circuit based its denial on Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988),
which held that the Texas special issues scheme did not foreclose a jury
from consideration of a clean prison record.
3 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
4 Graham v. Collins, 896 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1990).
5 Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1992)(en banc).
6 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
7 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
8 Graham v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 892, 897 (1993).
9 Id. at 898.
10 Id. at 903 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,495 (1990)).
which had held that the Texas special issues scheme offered juries
adequate opportunity to consider mitigating evidence. Penry claimed
that the Texas special issues framework made it impossible for a jury to
give mitigating effect to his evidence of child abuse and mental retarda-
tion. Such evidence, in fact, operated as an aggravating factor under the
special issue of future dangerousness, because his mental retardation
meant that Penry was likely to repeat his past behavior. Penry success-
fully argued to the Court that because his mitigating evidence of mental
retardation could not be given effect by the jury and act as a mitigating
factor, his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
In Penry, the Supreme Court was able to rule that its decision did
not amount to a new rule because it was dictated by Lockett v. Ohio
14
and Eddings v. Oklahoma,15 which both held that a sentencer may not
be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any
relevant evidence offered by the defendant as the basis for a sentence
less than death.16 Based on these two cases, a reasonable jurist at the
time of Penry's trial would have had to conclude that the Texas
sentencing scheme was deficient as applied to Penry. Because the
relief sought by Penry was dictated by Lockett and Eddings, Teague
therefore presented no obstacle to their application in Penry.
Graham's attempt to rely onLockett and Eddings, however, failed
because the special issues scheme did not foreclose Graham's attempts
to have the jury give effect to his evidence. Graham's evidence of
relative youth and good character fit within the accepted parameters of
the statute. The Court noted in Graham that defense counsel had urged
the jury to answer "no" to the special issues, 17 and if the jury had
believed that the mitigating evidence of good character and relative
youth outweighed the possibility of future dangerousness, they could
have given effect to Graham's evidence by answering "no" to the
second special issue.
18
Because Lockett and Eddings did not dictate a different result in
Graham, the Court ruled that his appeal amounted to a facial attack on
the former Texas death penalty statute. 19 To extend Penry as Graham
suggested, by allowing him a special jury instruction on his particular
mitigating evidence, the Court stated it would have to violate Teague
by creating a new rule and retroactively overrule its cases that had
approved of the Texas sentencing scheme.
Furthermore, the Court held that the first Teague exception did
not apply because "the rule Graham seeks 'would neither decriminal-
ize a class of conduct norprohibit the imposition of capital punishment
on a particular class of persons'." 20 The Court held that the second
exception did not apply because the denial of special jury instruction
on his mitigating evidence did not diminish the "'likelihood of obtain-
ing an accurate determination' in his sentencing proceeding."
21 The
Court reiterated the extremely difficult standard the Teague court set
for the second exception: "'because we operate from the premise that
such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components
of basic due process have yet to emerge'.
22
11 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 903.
12 Id. at 902.
13 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
14 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
15 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
16 Penry, 402 U.S. at 319.
17 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 902.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 903 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 495).
21 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 903 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407,416 (1990)).
22 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 903 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).
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Graham clearly demonstrates the powerful role which Teague
continues to play in the appellate process for capital cases. The Court
generally has taken a narrow view of what reasonable jurists at the time
of a defendant's trial would have held, 23 and therefore innovative
theories of law put forth on collateral review will rarely succeed.
There is little defense counsel can do at this point to combat the
harshness of Teague other than to try and place a claim within the
realm of prior precedent. So long as the Teague new rule doctrine is
in force defendants will be trapped in time, with only the remedies
available to them when their sentences became final to rely upon
during their appeals.
The other notable aspect of this case is Justice Thomas' concur-
rence. Echoing Justice Scalia's sentiments in Walton v. Arizona,
24
Justice Thomas used his concurrence to argue that the Lockett-Eddings
line of mitigation cases represent a regression towards the days of less
rational sentencing schemes. Justice Thomas examined at great length
the history of racially discriminatory practices in the use of the death
23 But see Stringer v. Black, 112 S.Ct. 1130 (1992) (holding that
Clemons v. Mississippi was not a "new rule" for Teague purposes). In
Stringer, the Court looked beyond the Teague threshold issue in order to
effectuate the requirement that the aggravating factors be stated with
specificity. See case summary of Stringer, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
5, No. 1, p. 11, nn. 84-92 and accompanying text (1992).
penalty, and argued that justice and fairness require less and not more
discretion on the part of juries in capital cases. Too much discretion,
he suggested, would allow racism to infiltrate the sentencer's decision.
Justice Thomas focused much of his attack on Penry itself,
arguing that the type of leniency which that case allows opens the door
to discriminatory practices: "We have consistently recognized that the
discretion to accord mercy - even if 'largely motivated by the desire
to mitigate' - is indistinguishable from the discretion to impose the
death penalty." 25 Justice Thomas sought to uphold rational responses
over moral ones, and therefore advocated giving Eddings a narrow
reading through which it would act more as a rule of evidence than a
rule of substantive law.26 In the end Justice Thomas viewed the Penry
decision as too big a step away from rationality and argued that it
should be overturned.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
24 497 U.S. 639, 661 (1990)(Scalia, J., dissenting). See case
summary of Walton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 5 (1990).
25 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 913 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313-14
(White, J., concurring)).
26 Graham, 113 S.Ct. at 910.
RICHMOND v. LEWIS
113 S.Ct. 528 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On August 25, 1973, Bernard Crummet met Rebecca Corella in
an Arizona bar where she agreed to perform an act of prostitution with
Crummet. The two left the bar and met the petitioner, Willie Lee
Richmond, and his girlfriend in the parking lot. Petitioner, Richmond
drove the group to Corella's hotel where he indicated to the group that
he intended to rob Crummet.
After the encounter between Crummet and Corella concluded,
the group again went for a drive. Once outside Tucson, Richmond
stopped the car, got out and struck Crummet to the ground. He then
threw several large rocks at the deceased, and either Richmond or
Corella or both of them proceeded to rob Crummet. Finally, either the
petitioner or Corella, whoever was driving, drove the car over Crummet
twice and caused his death.
Richmond was convicted of both robbery and first degree murder,
with the murder conviction being returned by a general verdict. The
trial judge then held the required penalty hearing and found that two
statutory aggravating factors existed: that petitioner had a prior felony
1 State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186,560 P.2d 41 (1976). In applying
for state postconviction relief, Richmond attached two affidavits by
persons who stated that Corella had claimed that she, not the petitioner,
had driven the car over the victim. The Supreme Court of Arizona
affirmed the conviction and sentence. In affirming the sentence, the court
did not reach defendant's vagueness challenge to the "especially hei-
nous, cruel or depraved" factor because it found that his death sentence
was supported by another valid statutory aggravating factor and that no
conviction involving the use or threat of violence on another person
and that the petitioner had committed the offense in an especially cruel
or depraved manner. The judge sentenced Richmond to death.
Although Richmond unsuccessfully sought state postconviction
relief of his specific sentence, 1 the Supreme Court of Arizona eventu-
ally held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional because it
limited defendants to statutory mitigating factors.2 Consequently, the
Arizona court vacated every pending death sentence, including
Richmond's.
3
At Richmond's resentencing hearing, petitioner's witnesses tes-
tified to the fact that Richmond was not the driver of the car and
presented evidence of petitioner's rehabilitation in prison. However,
the judge sentenced Richmond to death, this time finding three
statutory aggravating factors: a prior violent felony, the offense was
especially heinous, cruel or depraved, and a prior felony meriting life
imprisonment. 4 Once again, the judge did not specifically find that
Richmond had been the driver of the car. In addition, the judge found
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to warrant le-
niency.
mitigating factors applied.
Soon after denial of state relief, federal habeas proceedings took
place and the petitioner's conviction was affirmed but the sentence was




4 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703(F).
